This guidebook, intended for students, aims to introduce one of the most arduous classics of political philosophy, G.W.F. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1820). Dudley Knowles’ humorous, at times impertinent turn of phrase, which some readers will probably find irritating, should not distract from the great pedagogic and philosophical qualities of his book.

He presents clearly and accurately the main ideas of the Philosophy of Right, hidden though they are in the intricate technical jargon of German idealism. Undoubtedly, this book is a most useful aid for readers not familiar with Hegel’s thought and terminology. It provides direct, yet intelligent, access into his moral, legal, social and political theory.

Just as importantly, however, Knowles demonstrates convincingly the relevance of the Philosophy of Right to contemporary questions. What underlies the relevance of Hegel today lies in his account of autonomy. Knowles does not hesitate to claim that “we should regard (Hegel) as the greatest and most sophisticated of philosophers of freedom” (p. 27). He argues rightly that this sophisticated model of autonomy is the result of Hegel’s emphasis on the intersubjective constitution of selfhood through processes of recognition. The fundamental consequence of this is that it is impossible to conceptualise individual autonomy separate from the social and political conditions that make it real and concrete. The institutions of social life (the legal sphere, the economy, the family, the world of labour, the state) and the laws and norms they produce are “structures of the will” in a very particular sense: they require the subjective interest of individuals to function, but they also exist objectively, beyond the direct reach of individual subjectivity. To the individual they represent the different frameworks in which concrete features of identity are established. Knowles shows the coherence of Hegel’s treatise by analysing each section as addressing a specific “structure of the will”. The final notion of “ethical life” captures the full interdependency of institutions and subjectivities. The chapter devoted to this notion is the best in the book (chapter 9).

The implications of this model of autonomy are immense. It denounces the abstraction of the individualistic moral philosophy grounding liberal theories of justice. Knowles does full justice to Hegel’s famous critique of Kantian ethics (chapter 8). It is strange that he should then reject Hegel’s critique of social contract theories. A whole series of conceptual solutions to specific problems open up as a result of Hegel’s institutionalist definition of freedom. To mention three particularly thought-provoking chapters: Hegel’s theory of rights offers a viable alternative between a utilitarian and a Kantian foundation of legal theory (chapter 4); the definition of property avoids the problems liberal theories of justice are faced with regarding the problem of distribution (chapter 5); the theory of legal punishment announces modern critiques of consequentialist views (chapter 6).

Knowles correctly reminds the reader of the importance of Hegel to understand communitarianism’s critiques of liberalism. He might have added that there is space today for other types of Hegel-inspired political theory, as the work of Axel Honneth illustrates brilliantly.

Jean-Philippe Deranty